Currently, the most striking competitors of correspondence theories are deflationary (or “true”) truth-telling. Deflationists argue that theories of correspondence must be challenged; That their central ideas, their correspondence and their fact (and their loved ones) do not play a legitimate role in an adequate representation of the truth and can be cut without loss. A type of correspondence formulation such as although accounts of this type are naturally classified as versions of the match theory, it should be noted that they are strictly at odds with the basic forms of Section 3. According to logical atomism, it is not that there is a fact for every truth. However, the truth of all truth is always explained in the form of a correspondence (or a mismatch with any fact) with (in the case of molecular truths) logical concepts that describe the logical structure of complex truth carriers. Logical atomism attempts to avoid the obligation of logically complex and funny facts through structural analyses of truth vectors. It should not be confused with a superficially similar representation that molecular facts are ultimately formed by atomic facts. This last presentation would allow for complex facts that provide an ontological analysis of its structure and would therefore be consistent with the basic forms presented in point 3, as it would be consistent with the assertion that there is an equivalent fact for each truth. (For more information on classical logical atomism, see Wisdom 1931-1933, Urmson 1953, and entries on Russell`s logical atomism and Wittgenstein`s logical atomism in this encyclopedia.) Perhaps I have not presented this observation in the floral and spiritual language to which you are accustomed when we discuss pillars as sublime as “What is the meaning of life?” But as “existence is essential” (Sartre), so that metaphysics precedes the lingual, precedes the territory of the map, and the advanced metaphor is the only GPS that cannot be found by the direct route. To understand the nature of the inconceivable, known strangers and unknown strangers who lie beyond and inside, we need the stakes of the friend`s table.
We need constraints and conditions. In De Interpretatione, Aristotle takes Plato`s report without much serenity – in fact, the beginning of De Interpretatione reads as a direct continuation of the passages of the sophist mentioned above.